The following selection is from the monastic textbook entitled An Explanation of the Art of Reasoning (rTags-rigs), by the Tutor of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, Purbuchok Jampa Tsultrim Gyatso (1825-1901); ff. 9A-10A.
Formal logic subject:
Logical Statements that Use Natures
Here secondly is our explanation of correct reasons of the type that use natures. We will proceed in three steps: the definition, the divisions, and the classical examples.
Here is the first. The definition of a correct reason of the type that uses a nature is as follows:
A reason where the three relationships hold, and which utilizes a nature.
The definition of a correct reason of the type that uses a nature in any particular proof is as follows:
A reason where the three relationships hold, and which utilizes a nature, in any particular proof.
The definition of a correct reason of the type that uses a nature in any particular proof can also be defined as follows:
A reason which is (1) a correct reason in any particular proof, and (2) which is established as being this kind of reason [one that uses a nature] by virtue of the fact that anything considered the explicit quality to be proven for the particular proof in which it serves as the reason is necessarily such that to be it [the reason] is to be the quality.
Here is the second step. Correct reasons that utilize a nature can be divided into two different types: correct reasons that utilize a nature and which are such that they depend on a certain distinction, [of suggesting the thing that made it]; and correct reasons that utilize a nature and which are such they are free of dependency on a certain distinction, [of suggesting the thing that made it].
Here is the definition of the first:
A reason which is (1) a correct reason for any particular proof which utilizes a nature; and (2) which is established as being this kind of reason by virtue of the fact that the term which expresses it suggests the thing that made it.
The definition of the second is as follows:
A reason which is (1) the same as the first part just given; and (2) which is established as being this kind of reason by virtue of the fact that the term which expresses it does not suggest the thing that made it.
The first type may be further divided into two: those which suggest the thing that made them directly, and those which do so indirectly.
Here thirdly are the classical examples. “A thing which is produced by conscious effort” and “a thing which is brought about” are examples of the first type of reason, in a proof that the sound of a ritual horn is a changing thing. “A thing which is made” is an example of the second type of reason, in a proof that sound is a changing thing. “A working thing” is an example of a correct reason which utilizes a nature and which is such that it is free of dependency on a certain distinction, [of suggesting the thing that made it].
A correct reason which utilizes a nature and which is employed in the proof that sound is a changing thing can also be divided in a different way. This division would be into the two of (1) correct reasons which utilize a nature and which apply to the entire group of similar cases for the proof; and (2) correct reasons which utilize a nature and which both apply and fail to apply to the group of similar cases for the proof.
Respective examples would be the reason “a thing which is made,” and the reason “something characteristic of the quality of being made.”
Here is a demonstration for each of these.
“A thing which is made” is the first kind of reason,
Because it is (1) a correct reason for the particular proof which utilizes a nature;
and (2) it is such that, if something is a changing thing, it must always be it [that is, a thing which is made].
“Something characteristic of the quality of being made” is the second kind of reason,
Because it is (1) a correct reason for the particular proof which utilizes a nature; and (2) it is such that, if something is a changing thing, it is not necessarily it [that is, something characteristic of the quality of being made].
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Logical Statements Used to Prove an Absence of Something,
and the First Category of this Type of Statement
[The following selection is from the monastic textbook entitled An Explanation of the Art of Reasoning (rTags-rigs), by the Tutor of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, Purbuchok Jampa Tsultrim Gyatso; ff. 10A-12A.]
Here thirdly is our discussion of correct reasons of the type used to prove the absence of something. We will proceed in three parts: the definition, an explanation of the divisions, and a description of the valid perception where we confirm that the definition applies to a typical example.
Here is the first. The definition of a correct reason used to prove the absence of something in any particular proof is as follows:
Any reason which is (1) a correct reason for the particular proof; and (2) such that there can exist one thing which is both (a) the explicit version of the thing which is considered the quality to be proven in the particular proof in which it acts as the reason, and also (b) a negative thing.
Correct reasons to prove the absence of something can be divided into two types: correct reasons for the absence of something involving a thing which is imperceptible [to the particular opponent], and correct reasons for the absence of something involving a thing which is perceptible [to the particular opponent].
Here is the first. Now there is a sutra where it says,
No person should ever judge another; those who try will fall.
The point of these words is to show us how wrong it is for us to say that someone else lacks any particular good quality, only because it does not appear to us that they do. This same point is made in the Commentary with lines such as the following:
In a case where valid perception has yet
To engage in the object, the result obtained
Is that they don’t: they didn’t engage.
The definition of a correct reason used to prove the absence of something involving a thing which is imperceptible in any particular proof is as follows:
Any reason which is first of all a correct reason used to prove the absence of something for the particular proof, and which is secondly such that—even though the thing which is considered the main element of all which is denied by the proof in which it serves as the reason does generally exist—this thing is imperceptible to the valid perceptions of a person for whom this same reason fulfills its role in the relationship between the subject and the reason.
This kind of reason can be further divided into two types: a correct reason used to prove the absence of something in a particular proof, by virtue of the absence of a corollary which possesses a relationship [with whatever is denied]; and a correct reason used to prove the absence of something in a particular proof, by virtue of the presence of a corollary which is contradictory [to whatever is denied].
Here are the respective definitions. The first is defined as:
Anything which is first of all a correct reason in a particular proof for the absence of something involving a thing which is imperceptible, and which is secondly a negative in the sense of being the absence of something.
The second is defined as:
Anything which is first of all a correct reason in a particular proof for the absence of something involving a thing which is imperceptible, and which is secondly either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive.
The first of these can be divided into three types: those which are correct reasons used to prove the absence of something which represent (1) a cause for something involving a thing which is imperceptible; (2) a greater set than something involving a thing which is imperceptible; and (3) a nature of something involving a thing which is imperceptible.
Here are respective typical examples for the three. Suppose someone sets forth the following logical statement:
Consider the place in front of us.
There cannot exist here, in the mental continuum of a person
for whom flesheater spirits [another word for a preta, or tormented spirit] are still abstruse objects, a recollection whose object corresponds to reality, and which is used to ascertain the existence of a flesheater spirit;
Because there does not exist, in the mental continuum of this same person, any valid perception wherein he or she perceives any flesheater spirit.
Think of this fact: that there does not exist, in the mental continuum of this same person, any valid perception wherein he or she perceives any flesheater spirit. This represents the first type of reason just listed—for proving the fact that, in the place in front of us, there cannot exist, in the mental continuum of a person for whom flesheater spirits are still abstruse objects, a recollection whose object corresponds to reality, and which is used to ascertain the existence of a flesheater spirit.
Think now of the fact that a person for whom flesheater spirits are still abstruse objects has not yet perceived, with a valid perception, the fact that flesheater spirits exist. This represents the second type of reason just listed—for proving the fact that, in the place in front of us, it would be improper for a person for whom flesheater spirits are still abstruse objects to swear that flesheater spirits do exist.
Think finally of the fact that—in the mental continuum of a person for whom flesheater spirits are still abstruse objects—there cannot be perceived, with any valid perception, a recollection whose object corresponds to reality, and which is used to ascertain the existence of a flesheater spirit. This represents the third type of reason just listed—for proving the fact that, in the place in front of us, there does not exist, in the mental continuum of just such a person, any recollection whose object corresponds to reality, and which is used to ascertain the existence of a flesheater spirit.
There is a specific purpose to these kinds of proofs. We are demonstrating here that, if a person still doubted whether flesheater spirits existed (and if they were thus still objects which were abstruse for them), then it would be inappropriate for them to come to some definite conclusion in their own minds about whether these spirits existed or not. We are meant by this example to realize how inappropriate it is for us to either overestimate or underestimate any particular person we may encounter, unable as we still are to confirm—through a valid perception—whether or not they do in reality possess a particular positive or negative personal quality.
It is not necessarily the case, by the way, that if something is what we consider the main element in all that we deny in a particular logical statement, then it is also all that we deny in the same statement. Think of the possibility that there did exist, in the mental continuum of a person for whom flesheater spirits are still abstruse objects, a recollection whose object corresponds to reality, and which is used to ascertain the existence of a flesheater spirit. This is both what we consider the main element in all that we deny, and also all that we deny, in a proof that there does not exist any such recollection whose object corresponds to reality. The two of (1) flesheater spirits themselves, and (2) states of recollection whose objects correspond to reality, and which are used to ascertain the existence of such spirits, are—each of them separately—a kind of case where something is what we consider the main element in all that we deny in the particular logical statement, but not all that we deny in the particular logical statement.
The former example is easy. Suppose though that you say that the latter two are incorrect.
Consider then (1) flesheater spirits themselves, and (2) states of recollection whose objects correspond to reality, and which are used to ascertain the existence of such spirits.
These are so—each one of them separately—things that we consider the main element in all that we deny in the particular logical statement,
Because a correct opponent for this particular proof doubts whether or not flesheater spirits exist in the place in front of us, and also doubts whether or not there exists any such kind of recollection whose object corresponds to reality.
Neither one of these is though, by itself, all that we deny in the particular logical statement, because generally speaking there do exist flesheater spirits; and because smoke is not all that we deny in a proof that there exists no smoke upon the nighttime ocean.
Consider the fact that [the person described here] exists. This is an example of a correct reason used to prove the absence of something in a particular proof, by virtue of the presence of a corollary which is contradictory [to whatever is denied], for proving that a person for whom flesheater spirits are still abstruse objects still has no recollection which ascertains the existence of such spirits, and whose object corresponds to reality.
Generally speaking, there are three different ways in which an object can be abstruse, relative to your state of mind. These are objects which are abstruse by virtue of the place, time, and nature. The first would be something like the details of particular beings or realms which are situated at a great distance from your particular location. The second would be something like the details of events which have occurred or are going to occur at times which are eons away in the past or future. These things are not abstruse in their own general right, but only relative to a given state of mind. The third would be something which is abstruse by virtue of being very subtle in nature, even though it may exist in the immediate proximity. Examples of this would be things like a flesheater spirit, or a being between death and rebirth who is headed towards birth as a human or pleasure being, and their various heaps.
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The following selection is taken from An Explanation of the Art of Reasoning (rTags-rigs), by the great tutor, Purbuchok Jampa Tsultrim Gyatso; ff. 12A-16A.
Reasons for the Absence of Something
Which Involve Something Perceptible
There are two parts to our explanation of a correct reason for the absence of something which involves something perceptible [to the opponent]: the definition, and the divisions.
Here is the first. The definition of a correct reason for the absence of something which involves something perceptible is the following:
That thing which is both (1) a correct reason for the absence of something in a particular proof; and (2) such that the thing which is considered the main element of all which is denied by the proof is not an abstruse object to the person for whom this same reason fulfills its role in the relationship between the subject and the reason.
This type of reason may be divided into two types: a correct reason used to prove the absence of something perceptible in a particular proof, by virtue of the absence of a corollary which possesses a relationship [with whatever is denied]; and a correct reason used to prove the absence of something perceptible in a particular proof, by virtue of the presence of a corollary which is contradictory [to whatever is denied].
Here are the respective definitions of these two different types. The definition of the first is:
That thing which is both (1) a correct reason used to prove the absence of something perceptible in a particular proof and (2) a negative thing in the sense of being an absence of something.
The definition of the second is:
That thing which is both (1) a correct reason used to prove the absence of something perceptible in a particular proof and (2) either a negative thing in the sense of not being something, or a positive thing.
The first may be divided into four different types: Those reasons for the absence of something where the reason involves a cause, a comprehensive set, a nature, or an immediate result.
Respective definitions of these four are as follows. The first is defined as “A reason for the absence of something perceptible where the three relationships hold, and where this reason represents a cause.” This same pattern holds for the other three.
Respective typical examples of the four are as follows. The first would be “there is no fire there,” used as a reason to prove that there is no smoke on the surface of a [totally dark] nighttime ocean.
An example of the second would be “there are no trees there,” used as a reason to prove that there are no juniper trees on the surface of a barren rock crag where no trees can be perceived by a valid perception.
An example of the third would be “no water pitchers can be perceived there by a valid perception,” used as a reason to prove that there are no water pitchers in a particular place where no water pitchers can be perceived with a valid perception.
An example of the fourth would be “there is no smoke, its immediate result, there”—used as a reason to prove that there the immediate cause of some smoke does not exist atop a particular wall which is totally devoid of any smoke.
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Identifying Elements of a Logical Statement,
and Some Different Classifications of Correct Logical Statements
[Selection—An Explanation of the Art of Reasoning, ff. 16A-20A]
This bring us to the section where we identify the reason, the quality to be proven, and the subject. We proceed in two steps: presenting our position, and then putting forth proofs to support our position. Here is the first.
The expression “because there is no fire” is a logical reason for proving that there is no smoke on the surface of an ocean in the middle of the night in a proof where “because there is no fire” serves as the reason in the proof. “Because there’s no fire” is not a logical reason for the same proof where that same term serves as the reason in the proof.
The expression “there is no smoke” is both (1) the quality to be proven in that same proof, where “because there is no fire” serves as the reason; and (2) that which is considered the explicit form of the quality to be proven for the same proof. The expression “it’s smokeless” is neither of the two. This same pattern applies for the expressions such as “there are no trees” and so on.
The expression “because there is no water pitcher perceived to be there by any valid perception” is a logical reason for proving that there exists no water pitcher in a particular location where no water pitcher is perceived by any valid perception to be present. The expression “there exists no water pitcher there” is both (1) the explicit form of the quality to be proven in the same proof, where “because there is no water pitcher perceived to be there by any valid perception” is acting as the reason; and (2) that which is considered the explicit form of the quality to be proven in the same proof. This pattern follows for other cases as well.
A “flesheater spirit” [a preta, or tormented spirit] is a main element in the quality which is denied in a proof that, in the location before us, there can exist no recollection whose perception corresponds to reality, and which ascertains a flesheater spirit, in the mind of a person for whom flesheater spirits are abstruse objects. This same term though is not the “quality which is denied” itself.
The existence, in the mind of a person for whom flesheater spirits are abstruse objects, of a recollection whose perception corresponds to reality, and which ascertains a flesheater spirit, is both (1) the quality which is denied in this particular proof, and (2) a main element in the quality which is denied in the same proof.
The term “smoke” is a main element in the quality which is denied in a proof that there is no smoke on the surface of the nighttime ocean, but it is not the quality denied in the same proof.
The “existence of smoke in that particular place” is both (1) a main element in the quality which is denied in a proof that there is no smoke on the surface of the nighttime ocean, and (2) the quality which is denied in the same proof.
“An unchanging thing” is a main element in the quality which is denied in a proof that sound is not an unchanging thing, but it is not the quality which is denied in the same proof.
Here next is the second major point from above. Correct reasons may also be classified according to the quality to be proven. Here there are two types: Correct positive reasons, and correct negative reasons.
Here are their respective definitions. First comes the definition of a correct positive reason for any particular proof:
Something which is (1) a correct reason for a particular proof; and (2) which is such that there can exist one thing which is both (a) the object which is considered the explicit form of the quality to be proven in the proof where it acts as the reason, and (b) a positive thing.
These kinds of reasons may be divided into two types of their own: Correct reasons that involve a result, and correct reasons that involve a nature. Anything which is one of these two types of reasons is always a positive reason.
The definition of a correct negative reason for any particular proof is as follows:
Something which is (1) a correct reason for a particular proof; and (2) which is such that there can exist one thing which is both (a) the object which is considered the explicit form of the quality to be proven in the proof where it acts as the reason, and (b) a negative thing.
The terms “correct negative reason” and “correct reason for proving the absence of something” both refer to the same thing.
It is contradictory for one thing to be both a correct negative reason for a particular proof and also a correct positive reason for the same proof. It is not contradictory though for one thing to be both a correct negative reason and a correct positive reason. And this is because the expression “a thing which is made” can be both: It is both a correct negative reason for proving that sound is not an unchanging thing, and it is a correct positive reason for proving that sound is a changing thing.
Next is the third major point from above. Correct reasons may also be classified by according to how the proof is made. Here there are five different types:
1) Correct reasons for proving the meaning;
2) Correct reasons for proving the term;
3) Correct reasons for proving the meaning alone;
4) Correct reasons for proving the term alone; and
5) Correct reasons for proving both the meaning and the term.
We will discuss these reasons in three parts: their definition, typicial example, and supporting logic.
Here first is the definition of a correct reason for proving the meaning in any particular proof:
Something which is both (1) a correct reason for a particular proof; and (2) which is such that there can exist one thing which is both (a) the explicit form of the thing considered the quality to be proven for the particular proof in which it serves as the reason, and (b) a definition.
The definition of a correct reason for proving the term in any particular proof is as follows:
Something which is both (1) the same as the first part above; and (2) which is such that there can exist one thing which is both (a) the explicit form of the thing considered the quality to be proven for the particular proof in which it serves as the reason, and (b) something which is defined.
The definition of a correct reason for proving the meaning alone in any particular proof is as follows:
Something which is both (1) the same as the first part above; and (2) which is such that there cannot exist one thing which is both (a) the explicit form of the thing considered the quality to be proven for the particular proof in which it serves as the reason, and (b) something which is a thing defined—but which is though such that there can exist one thing which is both (a) the same as part “a” above and (b) something which is a definition.
The definition of a correct reason for proving the term alone in any particular proof is as follows:
Something which is both (1) the same as the first part above; and (2) which is such that there cannot exist one thing which is both (a) the explicit form of the thing considered the quality to be proven for the particular proof in which it serves as the reason, and (b) something which is a definition—but which is though such that there can exist one thing which is both (a) the same as part “a” above and (b) something which is a thing defined.
The definition of a correct reason for proving both the meaning and the term in any particular proof is as follows:
Something which is both (1) the same as the first part above; and (2) which is such that there can exist one thing which is both (a) the explicit form of the thing considered the quality to be proven for the particular proof in which it serves as the reason, and (b) something which is a definition—and there can also exist one thing which is both (a) the same as part “a” above and (b) something which is a thing defined.
“Something which only lasts a moment” is a correct reason for proving the term alone in a proof that sound is a changing thing; but it is not a correct reason in the same proof where “something which is made” is used as the reason. This is because, if something is a correct reason for this specific proof, it must be one and the same as “something which is made.”
“Something which is made” is a correct reason for proving the term alone in a proof that sound is a changing thing, when this proof is presented to a correct opponent who has already established, through a valid perception, that sound is a thing that only lasts a moment. Generally speaking though it is a correct reason for proving both the meaning and the term. This is because it is—when presented to an opponent who has not yet ascertained, through any valid perception, that sound is a thing that only lasts a moment—a correct reason for proving both the meaning and the term.
This brings us to the fourth major point, which is classifying correct reasons by the assertion to be proven. Here there are three different types: correct reasons involving deduction; correct reasons involving reasoned belief; and correct reasons involving convention.
The definition of the first is as follows:
Something which (1) a correct reason for the particular proof; and which (2) serves to produce a deductive type of valid perception towards the assertion of the particular reason.
The definition of the second is:
Something which (1) a correct reason for the particular proof; and which (2) serves to produce a valid perception of the type which involves reasoned belief, towards the assertion of the particular reason.
The definition of the third is:
Something which (1) a correct reason for the particular proof; and which (2) serves to produce a valid perception of the type which involves convention, towards the assertion of the particular reason.
The first of these may be divided further into three types: correct reasons which involve a result, a nature, and the absence of something. Respective typical examples would be the following.
1) “Because there is smoke,” a correct reason which involves deduction and is of the result type, for proving that fire exists in a smoky mountain pass;
2) “Because it is a thing which is made,” a correct reason which involves deduction and is of the nature type, for proving that sound is a changing thing; and
3) “Because there is no fire there,” a correct reason which involves deduction and is of the type relating to the absence of something, for proving that there is no smoke upon the surface of the nighttime ocean.
There are also these same three types for the second kind here: those which involve a result, a nature, and the absence of something. Examples here would be:
1) “Because it is scriptural authority which has withstood the three tests,” a correct reason which involves reasoned belief and is of the result type, for proving that the citation “Giving leads to possessions, and morality to happiness” is scriptural authority which is such that the person who spoke it possessed, before he spoke, a valid perception in which he or she realized the truth of what the citation expresses;
2) The same reason, as a correct reason which involves reasoned belief and is of the kind which relates to a nature, for proving that the same citation is unerring about what it expresses; and
3) The same reason, as a correct reason which involves reasoned belief and is of the kind which relates to the absence of something, for proving that the same citation is not erring about what it expresses.
[The “three tests,” by the way, are:
1) We have confirmed, with our own direct valid perceptions, those parts of the statement which correspond to “evident” reality;
2) We have confirmed, with our own logical, deductive form of valid perception, those parts of the statement which correspond to “hidden” reality; and
3) We have established that those parts of the statement which correspond to “deeply hidden” reality are free of any internal contradiction or similar faults.]
There are, finally, two types for the third kind here. “Because that’s how people think,” is an example of a correct reason which involves convention and which relates to a nature, to prove that it is nominally appropriate to speak of the moon as the “house of the rabbit.” The same expression, “Because that’s how people think,” is also an example of a correct reason which involves convention and which relates to the absence of something, to prove that it is not literally appropriate to speak of the moon as the “house of the rabbit.”
The fifth point is the classification of correct reasons according to how they relate to the group of similar cases. Here there are two types: correct reasons where the set of similar cases and the reason subsume each other; and correct reasons where they relate to each other in two dissimilar ways, [subsuming in one direction, but not in the other].
The definition of the first in a proof that sound is a changing thing is:
A reason where the three relationships hold, and where it and the group of similar cases in that particular proof subsume each other.
The definition of the second in the same proof is:
A reason where the three relationships hold, and where it and the group of similar cases in that particular proof relate to each other in two dissimilar ways.
A definitive example of the first type would be “a made thing,” while a definitive example of the second would be any particular kind of made thing.
The sixth and final division here is that critical one where the classification is made by correct opponent. Here there are two types: correct reasons to use in the context of oneself, and correct reasons to use in the context of others.
The definition of the first is as follows:
Anything which is both (1) a correct reason for proving that sound is a changing thing; and (2) a case where there is no correct opponent for the particular proof in which it serves as the reason.
Whenever the proponent seeks to establish something to his own mind, setting forth “because it’s a made thing” to himself in order to prove that sound is a changing thing, then “because it’s a made thing” is serving as a correct reason to use in the context of oneself, to prove that sound is a changing thing.
The definition of the second type above is as follows:
Anything which is both (1) a correct reason for proving that sound is a changing thing; and (2) a case where there is a correct opponent for the particular proof in which it serves as the reason.
“Because it’s a made thing” is a correct reason to use in the context of others, in proving that sound is a changing thing.
Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:
“Because it’s a made thing” is both a correct reason to use in the context of oneself, and a correct reason to use in the context of others, in proving that sound is a changing thing.
Consider “because it’s a made thing.”
So is it then the case that there is no correct opponent to whom it can be used as a
reason to prove that sound is a changing thing?
Because it is a correct reason to use in the context of oneself.
Now suppose you agree to our statement.
Consider this same thing.
There is so such a correct opponent,
Because this is a correct reason to use in the context of others.
Once again someone may come, to make the following claim:
There is no such thing as a correct reason to use in the context of oneself.
But this is incorrect,
Because in a case where “because it’s a made thing” has actually been employed as a correct reason to use, in the context of oneself, for proving that sound is a changing thing, then “because it’s a made thing’ is then a correct reason to use in the context of oneself.
We can moreover say that there do exist correct reasons to use in the context of oneself, because there does exist a correct reason to use in the context of oneself in order to prove that sound is a changing thing.
[It’s not correct to say that there does exist a correct reason to use in the context of oneself in order to prove that sound is a changing thing.]
Suppose you say that it’s not correct.
Consider knowable things.
So is it then the case that, whenever anything is a correct reason for proving that
sound is a changing thing, it can never be a correct reason, to use in the
context of oneself, in order to prove that sound is a changing thing?
Because you said it was not correct.
Suppose you agree that it can never be.
Consider “because it’s a made thing,” in a case where “because it’s a made thing” has actually been employed as a correct reason to use, in the context of oneself, for proving that sound is a changing thing.
So is it then not a correct reason to use in the context of oneself for this same proof?
Because it is a correct reason for this same proof.
Now all you can do is contradict yourself.
Moreover, isn’t it so that “because it’s a made thing” cannot be a correct reason to use, in the context of oneself, for proving that sound is a changing thing?
Because isn’t it a correct reason to use, in the context of others, to prove the same thing?
And isn’t this the case, because the logical statement given immediately below is a correct logical statement involving a correct reason to use in the context of others?
Consider sound.
It is a changing thing,
Because it’s a made thing.
On this point, someone may come and make the following claim:
So is it then true that—in a case where there is no correct opponent for a proof where “because it’s a made thing” is used as a reason to prove that sound is a changing thing—there is in fact a correct opponent for a proof where “because it’s a made thing” is used as a reason to prove that sound is a changing thing?
Because—in a case where “because it’s a made thing” has actually been employed as a correct reason to use, in the context of oneself, for proving that sound is a changing thing— “because it’s a made thing” is a correct reason to use, in the context of others, for proving that sound is a changing thing.
To this we answer, “Your reason is not correct.”
And suppose one did agree to your original statement.
So is it then the case that, where there is not something made, there is something made?
Because it is the case that—where there is no correct opponent for a proof in which “because it’s a made thing” is used as a reason to prove that sound is a changing thing—there is in fact a correct opponent for a proof where “because it’s a made thing” is used as a reason to prove that sound is a changing thing.
And you’ve already agreed that this reason is correct.
Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:
It is true that there does not exist any correct reason to use in the context of oneself. Nonetheless, “because it’s a made thing” is a correct reason to use, in the context of oneself, to prove that sound is a changing thing—in a case where “because it’s a made thing” has actually been employed as a correct reason to use, in the context of oneself, for proving that sound is a changing thing.
But this is incorrect,
Because there must then exist a correct reason to use in the context of oneself; Because there does exist a correct reason to use, in the context of oneself, for proving that sound is a changing thing.
And this is true because—in an instance where “because it’s a made thing” has actually been employed as a correct reason to use, in the context of oneself, for proving that sound is a changing thing—it is the case that (1) a made thing actually does exist, and (2) there does exist in this instance a correct reason to use, in the context of oneself, where “because it’s a made thing” is employed to prove that sound is a changing thing.
You’ve already agreed that the reason is correct.
It is moreover true that there does exist a correct reason to use, in the context of oneself, to prove that sound is a changing thing;
Because there is an instance where “because it’s a made thing” has actually been employed as a correct reason to use, in the context of oneself, for proving that sound is a changing thing.
And this is true because there is a person for whom “because it’s a made thing” has actually been employed as a correct reason to use, in the context of oneself, for this particular proof;
And this is true because there is a person for whom “because there is smoke there” has actually been employed as a correct reason to use, in the context of oneself, for proving that there is fire in a smoky mountain pass.
There is also the logical proof that we use to establish the existence of past and future lives:
Consider the mind of a common person [one who has not yet seen emptiness directly] who is just about to die.
There does exist, as its material result, a later state of mind;
Because it is a state of mind present in the being of a person who still possesses ignorant desire.
It is, for example, similar to the present state of mind.
And consider the mind of an infant who has just been born.
A mind which is of exactly the same type as it has preceded it, Because it is a state of mind.
It is, for example, like the mind of a very old person.
***************
[Folios 20A-24A]
Here is the second major division of our presentation, in which we explain the opposite of a correct reason: that is, incorrect reasons. We proceed in two steps: the definition of such reasons, and their various divisions.
The first of these we’ll discuss in terms of disproving our opponent’s beliefs, and then establishing our own beliefs. Here is the first.
Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:
“Any reason where the three relationships fail to hold” is the definition of an incorrect reason.
This though is mistaken, for there is no such thing as an incorrect reason: everything which exists is a correct reason [to prove something].
Here secondly is our own position. The definition of an incorrect reason for a particular proof is:
A reason for a particular proof where the three relationships fail to hold.
Here secondly are the various divisions of incorrect reasons. Although there is not, generally speaking, any such thing as an incorrect reason, we can say that there do exist the following types of incorrect reasons in specific contexts:
1) Contradictory reasons for specific proofs;
2) Indefinite reasons for specific proofs; and
3) Wrong reasons for specific proofs.
We will discuss the first of these in four steps: definition; divisions; classical examples; and supporting arguments.
Here is the first. The definition of a contradictory reason for proving that sound is an unchanging thing is:
That one thing for which (1) the relationship between the subject and the reason does hold for proving that sound is an unchanging thing; and (2) the positive necessity between the reason and the quality to be proven also holds for proving that sound is not an unchanging thing.
[A classical example would be: Consider sound. It is an unchanging thing, because it is a made thing.]Here secondly are the divisions.
Contradictory reasons can be divided into two kinds: those which have a relationship with the group of dissimilar cases where they cover it completely, and those which have a relationship with the group of dissimilar cases where they go both ways, [covering or not].
Here thirdly are the classical examples. “Something that was made” is a contradictory reason which has a relationship with the group of dissimilar cases where they cover it completely, in a proof that sound is not a changing thing. “Something which is a particular example of the general type called ‘made things'” is a contradictory reason which has a relationship with the group of dissimilar cases where they go both ways, in proving the same thing.
Next is the fourth category: the supporting arguments.
Consider “something that was made.”
It is so a contradictory reason which has a relationship with the group of
dissimilar cases where they cover it completely, in a proof that sound is
not a changing thing,
Because it is both (1) a contradictory reason for proving this particular thing, and (2) anything which is changing is also it.
And consider “something which is a particular example of the general type called ‘made things’.”
It is so a contradictory reason which has a relationship with the group of dissimilar cases where they go both ways, in a proof that sound is not a changing thing,
Because it is a contradictory reason for proving that sound is an unchanging thing.
And this is so because (1) the relationship between this reason and the subject of the particular proof holds; and (2) it is definitely the case that the positive necessity between it and the quality to be proven is diametrically false.
GZHAN YANG , DE CHOS CAN, SGRA RTAG PAR SGRUB PA’I ‘GAL RTAGS YIN PAR THAL, SGRA MI RTAG PAR SGRUB PA’I RTAGS YANG DAG YIN PA’I PHYIR,
Consider, moreover, this same example.
It is so a contradictory reason for proving that sound is an unchanging thing, Because it is a correct reason for proving that sound is a changing thing.
_______________
KHO NA RE, SGRA MI RTAG PAR SGRUB PA’I ‘GAL RTAGS YOD PAR THAL, SGRA RTAG PAR SGRUB PA’I ‘GAL RTAGS YOD PA’I PHYIR ZER NA MA KHYAB,
Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:
So does there exist then a contradictory reason for proving that sound is a changing thing?
Because there does exist a contradictory reason for proving that sound is an unchanging thing.
To this we answer, “It doesn’t necessarily follow.”
‘DOD MI NUS TE, SGRA MI RTAG PAR SGRUB PA’I GTAN TSIGS LTAR
SNANG YIN NA, DE SGRUB KYI MA NGES PA’I GTAN TSIGS DANG , DE SGRUB KYI MA GRUB PA’I GTAN TSIGS GANG RUNG YIN DGOS PA’I PHYIR,
And you could never agree [that there did exist a contradictory reason for proving that sound is a changing thing],
Because anything which is an incorrect reason for proving that sound is a changing thing must be either (1) an indefinite reason for the particular proof or (2) a wrong reason for the particular proof.
____________
KHA CIG GIS, DE SGRUB KYI TSUL GSUM YOD NA, DE SGRUB KYI RTAGS YANG DAG YOD PAS KHYAB CES ZER NA,
Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:
If there exist the three relationships for any particular proof, then there must exist a correct reason for the particular proof.
SHES BYA CHOS CAN, SGRA RTAG PAR SGRUB PA’I RTAGS YANG DAG YOD PAR THAL, SGRA RTAG PAR SGRUB PA’I TSUL GSUM YOD PA’I PHYIR,
Consider all knowable things.
There must then exist a correct reason for proving that sound is an unchanging
thing,
Because the three relationships do exist for proving that sound is an unchanging
thing.
KHYAB PA KHAS, MA GRUB NA, DER THAL, DE SGRUB KYI PHYOGS CHOS YOD PA GANG ZHIG, DE SGRUB KYI RJES KHYAB YOD, DE SGRUB KYI LDOG KHYAB YOD PA’I PHYIR,
You’ve already accepted that it necessarily follows.
Suppose then that you say that it’s not correct [that the three relationships do exist for proving that sound is an unchanging thing].
They do too exist, because (1) there exists a relationship between the reason and
the subject for this particular proof, and (2) there exists the positive necessity for the proof, and there exists the reverse necessity for the proof.
DANG PO GRUB STE, BYAS PA DE SGRA RTAG PAR SGRUB PA’I PHYOGS CHOS YIN PA’I PHYIR,
The first part of our reason here is correct, because the relationship between the reason and the subject holds when “something made” is used as the reason in a proof that sound is an unchanging thing.
MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DER THAL, DE SGRUB KYI ‘GAL RTAGS YIN PA’I PHYIR TE, SGRA MI RTAG PAR SGRUB PA’I RTAGS YANG DAG YIN PA’I PHYIR,
Suppose you say that it’s not correct [that the relationship between the reason and the subject holds when “something made” is used as the reason in a proof that sound is an unchanging thing].
Consider this same thing [that is, “something made”].
The relationship does too hold with it,
Because it is a contradictory reason for the particular proof.
And that’s true because it is a correct reason for proving that sound is a changing
thing.
GNYIS PA GRUB STE, CHOS DANG SKAD CIG MA MA YIN PA’I GZHI MTHUN PA DE, SGRA RTAG PAR SGRUB PA’I RJES KHYAB YIN PA’I PHYIR,
And the second reason is a correct one, because that one thing which is both an existing phenomenon and something which is not momentary satisfies the positive necessity in a proof that sound is an unchanging thing.
MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, DER THAL, KHYOD KYI RTAGS KYIS DE SGRUB KYI RTAGS CHOS GNYIS LDAN GYI MTHUN DPE YANG DAG YOD PA GANG ZHIG, KHYOD SGRA RTAG PAR SGRUB PA’I MTHUN PHYOGS KHO NA LA ‘GOD TSUL DANG MTHUN PAR YOD PA NYID DU TSAD MAS NGES PA’I PHYIR,
Suppose you say that this is not correct.
Consider this same thing [that one thing which is both an existing phenomenon
and something which is not momentary].
It does too [satisfy the relationship of positive necessity],
Because (1) there does exist a correct similar example which covers both the
reason and the quality to be proven, in this particular proof where that “one thing” we mentioned is used as the reason; and (2) this “one thing” can be verified, through a valid perception, as something that fits only the group of similar cases, in the way it is stated, within a proof that sound is an unchanging thing.
DANG PO GRUB STE, ‘DUS MA BYAS KYI NAM MKHA’ DE, KHYOD KYI RTAGS KYIS DE SGRUB KYI RTAGS CHOS GNYIS LDAN GYI MTHUN DPE YANG DAG YIN PA’I PHYIR,
Now the first part of our reason is correct, because “unproduced, empty space” would be a correct similar example which covers both the reason and the quality to be proven in this particular proof, where the “one thing” we mentioned is used as a reason.
GNYIS PA GRUB STE, KHYOD DE SGRUB KYI MTHUN PHYOGS KHO NA LA ‘GOD TSUL DANG MTHUN PAR YOD PA’I PHYIR TE, KHYOD RTAG PA’I MTSAN NYID YIN PA’I PHYIR,
And the second part of our reason is correct, because “that one thing which is both an existing phenomenon and something which is not momentary” is something that fits only the group of similar cases, in the way it is stated, within this particular proof.
And this is because it is, in fact, the definition of something which is unchanging.
GONG GI GSUM PA GRUB STE, CHOS DANG SKAD CIG MA MA YIN PA’I GZHI MTHUN PA DE DE YIN PA’I PHYIR,
The third part of our reason above, [that there exists the reverse necessity for the proof,] is also correct. This is because that one thing which is both (1) an existing phenomenon and (2) something which is not momentary fulfils that same necessity.
MA GRUB NA, DE CHOS CAN, SGRA RTAG PAR SGRUB PA’I LDOG KHYAB YIN PAR THAL, KHYOD KYI RTAGS KYIS DE SGRUB KYI RTAGS CHOS GNYIS DANG MI LDAN PA’I MI MTHUN DPE YANG DAG YOD, KHYOD DE SGRUB KYI MI MTHUN PHYOGS LA MED PA KHO NAR TSAD MAS NGES
PA’I PHYIR,
Now suppose you say that our last reason is not correct.
Consider this same thing [that is, that one thing which is both (1) an existing phenomenon and (2) something which is not momentary].
It does so fulfill the reverse necessity for the proof that sound is an unchanging thing,
Because there does exist a correct dissimilar example for the proof in which it serves as the reason; that is, an example which possesses neither the reason nor the quality to be proven for the particular proof. And it can also be verified, through a valid perception, that it only does not fit the group of dissimilar cases for the proof.
RTZA BAR ‘DOD NA, SGRA CHOS CAN, KHYOD RTAG PAR SGRUB PA’I RTAGS YANG DAG MED PAR THAL, KHYOD RTAG PA MA YIN PA’I PHYIR,
Suppose finally that you agree to the original statement: [that is, you agree that there must exist a correct reason for proving that sound is an unchanging thing].
Consider then sound.
It is rather so, that there exists no correct reason for proving that sound is an
unchanging thing;
Because it is not something which is unchanging.
_______________
KHO NA RE, SGRA RTAG PAR SGRUB PA’I TSUL GSUM YIN PA YOD PAR THAL, DE SGRUB KYI PHYOGS CHOS YIN PA YOD, DE SGRUB KYI RJES KHYAB YIN PA YOD, DE SGRUB KYI LDOG KHYAB YIN PA YOD PA’I PHYIR, ZER NA MA KHYAB BO, ,
Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:
It must then be so, that there is something for which all three relationships hold, in proving that sound is an unchanging thing;
Because there is something which fulfils the relationship between
the subject and the reason for this proof; and there is something which fulfils the positive necessity for the proof; and there is something which fulfils the reverse necessity for the proof.
To this we reply, “It doesn’t necessarily follow.” ____________
GNYIS PA MA NGES PA’I GTAN TSIGS BSHAD PA LA, MTSAN NYID DANG , DBYE BA GNYIS, DANG PO NI, SGRA RTAG PAR SGRUB PA’I PHYOGS CHOS KYANG YIN, SGRA RTAG PAR SGRUB PA’I RJES KHYAB MA YIN PA YANG YIN, SGRA RTAG PA MA YIN PAR SGRUB PA’I RJES KHYAB MA YIN PA YANG YIN PA’I GZHI MTHUN PA DE, SGRA RTAG PAR SGRUB PA’I MA NGES PA’I GTAN TSIGS KYI MTSAN NYID,
Here secondly is our explanation of an indefinite reason; we will proceed first with a definition, and then with the various divisions of this reason. Here is the first of these.
The following is the definition of an indefinite reason for proving that sound is an unchanging thing:
That one thing for which (1) the relationship between the subject and the reason for proving that sound is an unchanging thing does hold; (2) the reverse relationship between the reason and the subject for proving that sound is an unchanging thing does not hold; and (3) the reverse relationship between the reason and the subject for proving that sound is not an unchanging thing doesn’t hold either.
[A classical example would be: Consider sound. It is an unchanging thing, because there is no such thing as antlers on a rabbit’s head.]
GNYIS PA DBYE BA LA, DE SGRUB KYI THUN MONG MA YIN PA’I MA NGES PA’I GTAN TSIGS DANG , DE SGRUB KYI THUN MONG BA’I MA NGES PA’I GTAN TSIGS GNYIS, DANG PO LA MTSAN NYID DANG , MTSAN GZHI GNYIS LAS,
Here secondly are the divisions. This kind of reason can be divided into two:
unique indefinite reasons for a particular proof, and common indefinite reasons for a particular proof. We will discuss the first of these two in two steps: its definition, and a classical example for it.
DANG PO NI, KHYOD DE SGRUB KYI MA NGES PA’I GTAN TSIGS GANG ZHIG, KHYOD DE SGRUB PA LA PHYOGS CHOS CAN DU SONG BA’I GANG ZAG GIS, KHYOD DE SGRUB KYI MTHUN PHYOGS LA YOD PAR MA NGES PA YANG YIN, GANG ZAG DES KHYOD DE SGRUB KYI MI MTHUN PHYOGS LA YOD PAR MA NGES PA YANG YIN PA’I GZHI MTHUN PA DE, KHYOD DE SGRUB KYI THUN MONG MA YIN PA’I MA NGES PA’I GTAN TSIGS YIN PA’I MTSAN NYID,
Here is the first. The definition of something which is a unique indefinite reason for a particular proof is:
That one thing which is both (1) an indefinite reason for a particular proof; and (2) such that a person who already recognizes that it fulfils the relationship between the subject and the reason for the particular proof has yet to verify either one of the following: that it fits the group of similar cases for the proof, or that it fits the group of dissimilar cases for the proof.
GNYIS PA MTSAN GZHI NI, MNYAN BYA, SGRA MA YIN PA LAS LOG PA, SGRA’I LDOG PA RNAMS RE RE NAS, SGRA RTAG PAR SGRUB PA’I THUN MONG MA YIN PA’I MA NGES PA’I GTAN TSIGS DANG , SGRA MI RTAG PAR SGRUB PA’I THUN MONG MA YIN PA’I MA NGES PA’I GTAN TSIGS GNYIS KA YIN,
Here secondly are some classical examples.
The following are all both unique indefinite reasons for proving that sound is an unchanging thing, and unique indefinite reasons for proving that sound is a changing thing:
something you can hear;
the reverse of all that is not sound; and the reversal of sound.
GNYIS PA THUN MONG BA’I MA NGES PA’I GTAN TSIGS LA, MTSAN NYID, DBYE BA GNYIS LAS, DANG PO NI, KHYOD DE SGRUB KYI MA
NGES PA’I GTAN TSIGS GANG ZHIG, KHYOD DE SGRUB PA LA PHYOGS CHOS CAN DU SONG BA’I GANG ZAG GIS KHYOD DE SGRUB KYI MTHUN PHYOGS LA YOD PAR NGES PA DANG , GANG ZAG DES DE SGRUB KYI MI MTHUN PHYOGS LA YOD PAR NGES PA GANG RUNG YANG YIN PA’I GZHI MTHUN PA DE, KHYOD DE SGRUB KYI THUN MONG BA’I MA NGES PA’I GTAN TSIGS KYI MTSAN NYID,
We will discuss the second type, common indefinite reasons, in two steps as well: definition, and divisions. Here is the first.
The definition of a common indefinite reason is:
That one thing which is both (1) an indefinite reason for a particular proof; and (2) such that a person who already recognizes that it fulfils the relationship between the subject and the reason for the particular proof has either verified (a) that it fits the group of similar cases for the proof, or (b) that it fits the group of dissimilar cases for the proof.
GNYIS PA NI, DE LA DBYE NA, DE SGRUB KYI DNGOS KYI MA NGES PA’I GTAN TSIGS, LHAG LDAN GYI MA NGES PA’I GTAN TSIGS, DE GANG RUNG MA YIN PA’I MA NGES PA’I GTAN TSIGS DANG GSUM LAS, DANG PO LA, MTSAN NYID DANG , DBYE BA GNYIS,
Here is the second. These types of reasons may be divided into three: those which are direct indefinite reasons for a particular proof; those which are uncertain indefinite reasons for a particular proof; and those indefinite reasons which are neither of the first two. Again we will discuss the first of these in terms of its definition and its divisions.
DANG PO NI, KHYOD DE SGRUB KYI MA NGES PA’I GTAN TSIGS GANG ZHIG, KHYOD DE SGRUB PA LA PHYOGS CHOS CAN DU SONG PA’I GANG ZAG GIS, KHYOD DE SGRUB KYI MTHUN PHYOGS DANG , MI MTHUN PHYOGS GNYIS KA LA YOD PAR NGES PA DE, KHYOD DE SGRUB KYI DNGOS KYI MA NGES PA’I GTAN TSIGS YIN PA’I MTSAN NYID,
Here is the first.
The definition of something which is a direct indefinite reason is:
That one thing which is both (1) an indefinite reason for a particular proof; and (2) such that a person who already recognizes that it fulfils the relationship between the subject and the reason for the particular proof has verified that it fits both the group of similar cases and the group of dissimilar cases for the proof.
GNYIS PA DBYE BA NI, DE LA DBYE NA, DE SGRUB KYI MTHUN PHYOGS LA KHYAB BYED DANG , MI MTHUN PHYOGS LA KHYAB BYED DU ‘JUG PA’I DNGOS KYIS MA NGES PA’I GTAN TSIGS DANG , DE SGRUB KYI MTHUN PHYOGS LA KHYAD BYED DANG , MI MTHUN PHYOGS LA RNAM GNYIS SU ‘JUG PA’I DE DANG , DE SGRUB KYI MI MTHUN PHYOGS LA KHYAB BYED DANG , MTHUN PHYOGS LA RNAM GNYIS SU ‘JUG PA’I DE DANG , DE SGRUB KYI MI MTHUN PHYOGS DANG MTHUN PHYOGS GNYIS KA LA RNAM GNYIS SU ‘JUG PA’I DE DANG BZHI,
Here secondly are the divisions of this type of reason. They come in four different types:
1) Those direct indefinite reasons that cover both the group of similar cases and the group of dissimilar cases for the particular proof;
2) Those same kinds of reasons that cover the group of similar cases for the particular proof, but which go both ways as far as its group of dissimilar cases;
3) Those same kinds of reasons that cover the group of dissimilar cases for the particular proof, but which go both ways as far as its group of similar cases; and
4) Those same kinds of reasons that go both ways as far as both the group of dissimilar cases and the group of similar cases for the particular proof.
MTSAN GZHI RIM PA LTAR, RI BONG RVA MED PA DE, SGRA RTAG PAR SGRUB PA’I MTHUN PHYOGS LA KHYAB BYED DANG , DE SGRUB KYI MI MTHUN PHYOGS LA YANG KHYAB BYED DU ‘JUG PA’I DNGOS KYI MA NGES PA’I GTAN TSIGS DANG ,
Here are respective classical examples for each of these types.
1) The fact that there are no such things as rabbit antlers would be a direct indefinite reason that covers both the group of similar cases in a proof that sound is an unchanging thing, and the group of dissimilar cases for this same proof.
MI RTAG PA DE, DUNG SGRA RTZOL BYUNG DU SGRUB PA’I MTHUN PHYOGS LA KHYAB BYED DANG , MI MTHUN PHYOGS LA RNAM GNYIS SU ‘JUG PA’I DE DANG ,
2) “Changing thing” would be a direct indefinite reason that covers the group of similar cases in a proof that the sound of a conch shell is something produced through a conscious effort, but which goes both ways as far as the group of dissimilar cases for this same proof.
MI RTAG PA DE, DUNG SGRA RTZOL BYUNG MA YIN PAR SGRUB PA’I MI MTHUN PHYOGS LA KHYAB BYED DANG , MTHUN PHYOGS LA RNAM GNYIS SU ‘JUG PA’I DE DANG ,
3) “Changing thing” would be a direct indefinite reason that covers the group of dissimilar cases in a proof that sound of a conch shell is not something produced through a conscious effort, but which goes both ways as far as its group of similar cases.
DBANG SHES DE, ZLA BA GNYIS SNANG GI DBANG SHES MNGON SUM DU SGRUB PA’I MTHUN PHYOGS DANG , MI MTHUN PHYOGS GNYIS KA LA RNAM GNYIS SU ‘JUG PA’I DNGOS KYI MA NGES PA’I GTAN TSIGS YIN,
4) “Sense consciousness” would be a direct indefinite reason that goes both ways as far as both the group of dissimilar cases and the group of similar cases in a proof that a sense consciousness which thinks there are two moons [where there is only one] is a direct [valid] perception.
`GNYIS PA LHAG LDAN GYI MA NGES PA’I GTAN TSIGS LA YANG , MTSAN NYID DANG , DBYE BA GNYIS LAS DANG PO NI, KHYOD DE SGRUB KYI THUN MONG BA’I MA NGES PA’I GTAN TSIGS GANG ZHIG, KHYOD DE SGRUB PA LA PHYOGS CHOS CAN DU SONG BA’I GANG ZAG GIS, KHYOD DE SGRUB KYI MTHUN PHYOGS LA YOD PAR NGES NAS, MI MTHUN PHYOGS LA YOD MED THE TSOM ZA BA DANG , KHYOD DE SGRUB KYI MI MTHUN PHYOGS LA YOD PAR NGES NAS, MTHUN
PHYOGS LA YOD MED THE TSOM ZA BA GANG RUNG YIN PA DE, KHYOD DE SGRUB KYI LHAG LDAN GYI MA NGES PA’I GTAN TSIGS YIN PA’I MTSAN NYID,
Here secondly is our discussion of uncertain indefinite reasons; we will repeat the two steps of their definition and their divisions. Here is the first.
The definition of something’s being an uncertain indefinite reason for a particular proof is the following:
That one thing which is both (1) a common indefinite reason for a particular proof; and (2) such that a person who already recognizes that it fulfils the relationship between the subject and the reason for the particular proof has either (a) already verified that it fits the group of similar cases for the proof, but is still uncertain whether it fits the group of dissimilar cases for the proof or not; or else (b) already verified that it does fit the group of dissimilar cases for the proof, but is still uncertain whether it fits the group of similar cases for the proof or not.
GNYIS PA DBYE BA NI, YANG DAG LHAG LDAN GYI MA NGES PA’I GTAN TSIGS DANG , ‘GAL BA LHAG LDAN GYI MA NGES PA’I GTAN TSIGS GNYIS LAS,
Here secondly are the divisions of this type of reason. There are two: correct uncertain indefinite reasons and contradictory uncertain indefinite reasons.
KHYOD DE SGRUB KYI LHAG LDAN GYI MA NGES PA’I GTAN TSIGS GANG ZHIG, KHYOD DE SGRUB PA LA PHYOGS CHOS CAN DU SONG BA’I GANG ZAG GIS, KHYOD DE SGRUB KYIS MTHUN PHYOGS LA YOD PAR NGES NAS, MI MTHUN PHYOGS LA YOD MED THE TSOM ZA BA DE, KHYOD DE SGRUB KYI YANG DAG LHAG LDAN GYI MA NGES PA’I GTAN TSIGS YIN PA’I MTSAN NYID,
The definition of something’s being a correct uncertain indefinite reason for a particular proof is:
That one thing which is both (1) an uncertain indefinite reason for a particular proof; and (2) such that a person who already recognizes that it fulfils the relationship between the subject and the reason for the
particular proof has already verified that it fits the group of similar cases for the proof, but is still uncertain whether it fits the group of dissimilar cases for the proof or not.
KHYOD DE SGRUB KYI LHAG LDAN GYI MA NGES PA’I GTAN TSIGS GANG ZHIG, KHYOD DE SGRUB PA LA PHYOGS CHOS CAN DU SONG BA’I GANG ZAG GIS, KHYOD DE SGRUB KYI MI MTHUN PHYOGS LA YOD PAR NGES NAS, MTHUN PHYOGS LA YOD MED THE TSOM ZA BA DE, KHYOD DE SGRUB KYI ‘GAL BA LHAG LDAN GYI MA NGES PA’I GTAN TSIGS YIN PA’I MTSAN NYID,
The definition of something’s being a contradictory uncertain indefinite reason for a particular proof is:
That one thing which is both (1) an uncertain indefinite reason for a particular proof; and (2) such that a person who already recognizes that it fulfils the relationship between the subject and the reason for the particular proof has already verified that it fits the group of dissimilar cases for the proof, but is still uncertain whether it fits the group of similar cases for the proof or not.
MTSAN GZHI RIM PA LTAR, NGAG SMRA BA DE, KUN MKHYEN LA THE TSOM ZA BA’I GANG ZAG GI NGOR, NGAG SMRA BA’I LHAS BYIN KUN MKHYEN MA YIN PAR SGRUB PA’I DANG PO DANG ,
Here are some examples, in the order we gave the definitions. An example of the first would be giving “because he is making pronouncements” as a reason for proving that John, who is making pronouncements, is not an omniscient being— and giving this reason to someone who doubts the existence of an omniscient being.
YANG DE DE’I NGOR NGAG SMRA BA’I LHAS SPYIN KUN MKHYEN DU SGRUB PA’I GNYIS PA YIN,
The same reason presented to the same person to prove that John, who is making pronouncements, is an omniscient being would be an example of the second type.
GSUM PA DE GNYIS GANG RUNG MA YIN PA’I THUN MONG BA’I MA NGES PA’I GTAN TSIGS LA YANG , MTSAN NYID DANG , MTSAN GZHI
GNYIS LAS,
Here thirdly we’ll explain those common indefinite reasons which are neither the direct nor uncertain types. Again we proceed in terms of definition and classical example.
DANG PO NI, KHYOD DE SGRUB KYI THUN MONG BA’I MA NGES PA’I GTAN TSIGS GANG ZHIG, KHYOD DE SGRUB PA LA PHYOGS CHOS CAN DU SONG BA’I GANG ZAG GIS, KHYOD DE SGRUB KYI MTHUN PHYOGS KHO NA LA YOD PAR NGES PA DANG , KHYOD DE SGRUB KYI MI MTHUN PHYOGS KHO NA LA MED PAR NGES PA GANG RUNG YIN PA DE, KHYOD DE SGRUB KYI DE GNYIS GANG RUNG MA YIN PA’I THUN MONG BA’I MA NGES PA’I GTAN TSIGS YIN PA’I MTSAN NYID,
Here is the first. The definition of something being a common indefinite reason which is neither the direct nor the uncertain types for a particular proof is:
That one thing which is both (1) a common indefinite reason for a particular proof; and (2) such that a person who already recognizes that it fulfils the relationship between the subject and the reason for the particular proof has already verified either that it fits only the group of similar cases for the proof, or that it only doesn’t fit the group of dissimilar cases for the proof.
GNYIS PA MTSAN GZHI NI, BU RO DA LTA BA DE, KHA NANG BU RAM GONG BU’I STENG DU BUR GZUGS DA LTA BA YOD PAR SGRUB PA’I DE GNYIS GANG RUNG MA YIN PA’I THUN MONG BA’I MA NGES PA’I GTAN TSIGS KYI MTSAN GZHI YIN, ,
Here secondly is our classical example. “[Because there is a] taste of sugar in the present time” is a common indefinite reason which is neither the direct nor the uncertain types in a proof that a lump of sugar in one’s mouth has the visible appearance of a lump of sugar in the present time.
GSUM PA MA GRUB PA’I GTAN TSIGS LA, , MTSAN NYID DANG , DBYE BA GNYIS LAS, DANG PO NI, DE SGRUB KYI RTAGS SU BKOD PA GANG ZHIG, DE SGRUB KYI PHYOGS CHOS MA YIN PA DE, DE SGRUB KYI MA GRUB PA’I GTAN TSIGS KYI MTSAN NYID,
Here third is our presentation on wrong reasons. Again we proceed in two steps
of definition and divisions. Here is the first.
The definition of a wrong reason for any particular proof is:
That which (1) has been put forth as a reason for a particular proof, but (2) for which the relationship between the subject and the reason does not hold.
GNYIS PA DBYE BA LA, DON LA LTOS NAS MA GRUB PA’I GTAN TSIGS, BLO LA LTOS NAS MA GRUB PA’I GTAN TSIGS, RGOL BA LA LTOS NAS MA GRUB PA’I GTAN TSIGS DANG GSUM LAS,
Here secondly are the divisions of wrong reasons for particular proofs. There are three different types:
1) Reasons which are wrong relative to meaning.
2) Reasons which are wrong relative to a state of mind.
3) Reasons which are wrong relative to the particular opponent.
DANG PO LA, RTAGS KYI NGO BO MED NAS MA GRUB PA’I GTAN TSIGS, CHOS CAN GYI NGO BO MED NAS MA GRUB PA’I GTAN TSIGS, RTAGS CHOS THA DAD MED NAS MA GRUB PA’I GTAN TSIGS, GZHI RTAGS THA DAD MED NAS MA GRUB PA’I GTAN TSIGS, GZHI CHOS THA DAD MED NAS MA GRUB PA’I GTAN TSIGS, RTAGS SHES ‘DOD CHOS CAN GYI STENG DU ‘GONG TSUL DANG MTHUN PAR MED NAS MA GRUB PA’I GTAN TSIGS, GTAN TSIGS KYI PHYOGS GCIG SHES ‘DOD CHOS CAN LA MED NAS MA GRUB PA’I GTAN TSIGS DANG BDUN, MTSAN GZHI RIM PA LTAR,
The first of these may itself be divided into seven different types:
1) Reasons which are wrong because the very nature of the reason is non-existent.
2) Reasons which are wrong because the very nature of the subject is non-existent.
3) Reasons which are wrong because the reason and the quality to be proven are indistinguishable from one another.
4) Reasons which are wrong because the subject and the reason are indistinguishable from one another.
5) Reasons which are wrong because the subject and the quality to be proven are indistinguishable from one another.
6) Reasons which are wrong because the reason does not pertain to the subject in the way it has been said to in the statement of the proof.
7) Reasons which are wrong because some part of the reason fails to belong to the subject under consideration.
The following are respective examples of these types of reasons, in particular proofs:
SKYES BU CHOS CAN, SDUG BSNGAL BA YIN TE, RI BONG RVAS BO PHUG PA’I PHYIR, ZHES BKOD PA’I TSE, DE SGRUB KYI DANG PO DANG ,
1)
Consider a particular person.
They are a suffering being,
Because they have been impaled on a rabbit’s antlers.
RI BONG RVA CHOS CAN, MI RTAG STE, BYAS PA’I PHYIR, ZHES BKOD PA’I TSE, DE SGRUB KYI GNYIS PA DANG ,
2)
Consider the antlers on the head of a rabbit. They are a changing thing,
Because they were made.
SGRA CHOS CAN, MI RTAG STE, MI RTAG PA YIN PA’I PHYIR, ZHES BKOD PA’I TSE, DE SGRUB KYI GSUM PA DANG ,
3)
Consider sound.
It is a changing thing, Because it is a changing thing.
SGRA CHOS CAN, MI RTAG STE, SGRA YIN PA’I PHYIR, ZHES BKOD PA’I TSE, DE SGRUB KYI BZHI PA DANG ,
4)
Consider sound.
It is a changing thing, Because it is sound.
SGRA CHOS CAN, SGRA YIN TE, BYAS PA’I PHYIR, ZHES BKOD PA’I TSE, DE SGRUB KYI LNGA PA DANG ,
5)
Consider sound.
It is sound,
Because it is something which was made.
SGRA CHOS CAN, MI RTAG STE, MIG SHES KYIS BZUNG BYA YIN PA’I PHYIR, ZHES BKOD PA’I TSE, DE SGRUB KYI DRUG PA DANG ,
6)
Consider sound.
It is a changing thing,
Because it is something that you see with your eyes.
LJON SHING CHOS CAN, SEMS LDAN YIN TE, MTSAN MO LO MA KHUM NAS NYAL BA’I PHYIR, ZHES BKOD PA’I TSE, DE SGRUB KYI BDUN PA YIN NO, ,
7)
Consider a fruit tree.
It must be a conscious thing,
Because its leaves curl up and night and seem to sleep.
GNYIS PA BLO LA LTOS NAS MA GRUB PA’I GTAN TSIGS LA, RTAGS KYI NGO BO LA THE TSOM ZOS NAS MA GRUB PA’I GTAN TSIGS CHOS CAN GYI NGO BO LA THE TSOM ZOS NAS MA GRUB PA’I GTAN TSIGS, GZHI RTAGS KYI ‘BREL BA LA THE TSOM ZOS NAS MA GRUB PA’I GTAN TSIGS, SHES ‘DOD CHOS CAN MED NAS MA GRUB PA’I GTAN TSIGS DANG BZHI, MTSAN GZHI RIM PA LTAR,
This brings us to the second kind of wrong reason: the one that is wrong relative to a state of mind. Here there are four different types:
1) Reasons that are wrong because the opponent entertains doubt about the very nature of the reason.
2) Reasons that are wrong because the opponent entertains doubt about the very nature of the subject.
3) Reasons that are wrong because the opponent entertains doubt about the connection between the subject and the reason.
4) Reasons that are wrong because there is nothing that the opponent has yet to understand.
The following are respective examples of these four, for particular proofs.
SHA ZA BSKAL DON DU SONG BA’I GANG ZAG GI NGOR, SGRA CHOS CAN, MI RTAG STE, SHA ZA TSAD MA’I GZHAL BYA YIN PA’I PHYIR, ZHES BKOD PA’I TSE, DE SGRUB KYI DANG PO DANG ,
1) The following proof, presented to a person who has yet to confirm to himself that “flesh-eaters” [a kind of ghost] actually exist:
Consider sound.
It is a changing thing,
Because flesh-eaters are something which can be cognized through valid
perception.
DRI ZA BSKAL DON DU SONG BA’I GANG ZAG GI NGOR, , DRI ZA’I GLU DBYANGS CHOS CAN, MI RTAG STE, BYAS PA’I PHYIR, ZHES BKOD PA’I TSE, DE SGRUB KYI GNYIS PA DANG ,
2) The following proof, presented to a person who has yet to confirm to himself that “smell-eaters” [spirits in the bardo or inbetween state] actually exist:
Consider the song of the smell-eaters. It is a changing thing,
Because it is something that was made.
RMA BYA GANG NA YOD MA SHES PA’I GANG ZAG GI NGOR, RI SUL GSUM GYI DBUS NA CHOS CAN, RMA BYA YOD DE, RMA BYAS SGRA SGROGS PA YOD PA’I PHYIR, ZHES BKOD PA’I TSE, DE SGRUB KYI GSUM PA DANG ,
3) The following proof, presented to a person who doesn’t know where a particular peacock is:
Consider that mountain vale over there. There must be a peacock living there, Because we can hear a peacock crowing.
DPAL LDAN CHOS GRAGS KYI NGOR, SGRA CHOS CAN, MI RTAG STE, BYAS PA’I PHYIR, ZHES BKOD PA’I TSE, DE SGRUB KYI BZHI PA YIN NO,
4) The following proof, presented to the glorious Dharmakirti:
Consider sound.
It is a changing thing,
Because it is something that was made.
GSUM PA RGOL BA LA LTOS NAS MA GRUB PA’I GTAN TSIGS LA, SNGA RGOL LA LTOS NAS MA GRUB PA’I GTAN TSIGS, PHYI RGOL LA LTOS NAS MA GRUB PA’I GTAN TSIGS, SNGA RGOL PHYI RGOL GNYIS KA LA LTOS NAS MA GRUB PA’I GTAN TSIGS DANG GSUM LAS, MTSAN GZHI RIM PA LTAR,
Here thirdly is our explanation of reasons which are wrong relative to the particular opponent. There are three different kinds of these reasons:
1) Reasons which are wrong relative to the proponent.
2) Reasons which are wrong relative to the opponent.
3) Reasons which are wrong relative to both the opponent and the proponent.
Here are respective examples for these three types of reasons, in particular proofs.
GRANGS CAN PAS SANGS RGYAS PA’I NGOR, BLO CHOS CAN, SEMS MED YIN TE, SKYE ‘JIG CAN YIN PA’I PHYIR, ZHES BKOD PA’I TSE, DE SGRUB KYI DANG PO DANG ,
1) The following proof, presented to a Buddhist by a Numerist [of member of the Sangkya, a non-Buddhist school of ancient India]:
Consider the intellect.
It is something devoid of mind,
Because it is something which starts and stops.
GCER BU PAS, SANGS RGYAS PA’I NGOR, LJON SHING CHOS CAN, SEMS LDAN YIN TE, SHUN BSHUS NA ‘CHI BA’I PHYIR, ZHES BKOD PA’I TSE, DE SGRUB KYI GNYIS PA DANG ,
2) The following proof, presented to a Buddhist by a member of the Unclothed [or Jain school of ancient India]:
Consider a fruit tree.
It must have a mind,
Because it dies when you peel its bark.
GRANGS CAN GYIS RGYANG ‘PHEN PA’I NGOR, SGRA CHOS CAN, MI RTAG STE, MIG SHES KYIS BZUNG BYA YIN PA’I PHYIR, ZHES BKOD PA’I TSE, DE SGRUB KYI GSUM PA YIN NO, ,
3) The following proof, presented to a member of the Rejectionist [Lokayata] school by one of the Unclothed [Jain] school [both non-Buddhist groups of ancient India]:
Consider sound.
It is a changing thing,
Because it is something you see with your eyes.
************
The definition of a reason
[From An Explanation of the Art of Reasoning, f. 2A]
DANG PO LA, RTAGS SU BKOD PA, RTAGS KYI MTSAN NYID, DE SGRUB KYI RTAGS SU BKOD PA, DE SGRUB KYI RTAGS KYI MTSAN NYID,
Here is the first part of our discussion. The definition of a reason is “Anything put forth as a reason.” The definition of a reason in any particular logical statement is, “Anything put forth as the reason in any particular logical statement.”
YOD MED GANG RUNG YIN NA, DE SGRUB KYI RTAGS YIN PAS KHYAB STE, DE YIN NA, DE SGRUB KYI RTAGS SU BKOD PAS KHYAB PA’I PHYIR TE, RI BONG RVA DE, DE CHOS CAN, MI RTAG STE, RI BONG RVA YIN PA’I PHYIR ZHES PA’I RTAGS SU BKOD PA’I PHYIR,
It doesn’t even matter if something exists or not, it can always be a reason in any particular logical statement. This is because of the fact that, no matter what something may be, it can still always be put forth as the reason in any particular logical statement. And this is true because even the horns of a rabbit can be put forth as a reason, in the following way:
Consider anything, whether it exists or not. It is a changing thing,
Because it is the horns of a rabbit.
SGRA MI RTAG PAR SGRUB PAR BYED PA’I RTAGS SU BKOD PA, SGRA MI RTAG PAR SGRUB PAR BYED PA’I RTAGS KYI MTSAN NYID, BYAS RTAGS KYI SGRA MI RTAG PAR SGRUB PA’I RTAGS SU BKOD PA, BYAS RTAGS KYI SGRA MI RTAG PAR SGRUB PA’I RTAGS KYI MTSAN NYID, DE BZHIN DU GZHAN LA YANG SBYOR TSUL RIGS ‘DRA’O,
The definition of the reason in a logical statement to prove that sound is a changing thing is, “Anything put forth as the reason in a logical statement to prove that sound is changing.” The definition of the reason in a logical statement where a thing which is made is used as a reason in a logical statement to prove that sound is changing is, “Anything put forth as the reason in a logical statement where a thing which is made is used as a reason in a logical statement to prove that sound is changing.” This same pattern applies to all other cases as well.
